“Atlanta man gets year in jail in Mt. Holyoke College gun case”
Without any sort of background on the case, it sounds pretty open-and-shut, if a bit sensationalistic. College campus, guns, conviction. There you go. However, there are a few aspects that make this case one for more scrutiny.
The first aspect is that the Atlanta man involved, Mr. Clint Cornelius, was moving to Massachusetts, not simply visiting. Clint had flown to Massachusetts and visited and stayed at Mount Holyoke multiple times. He had a deep appreciation for Northampton and its small-town atmosphere; as a strength coach, having several nearby colleges (and collegiate athletes) made Northampton an ideal location to which to re-locate. Clint drove from Georgia to Northampton, with his car packed with his clothing, work-related belongings such as a computer and fitness equipment, and his valuables, which included $3000+ in the form of three firearms and accompanying accessories.
Clint intended to immediately seek residence in Massachusetts, which would provide him a permanent local address and qualify him for a Massachusetts driver’s license, as well as registration for his car and licensing for his firearms.
After an approximately 20-hour drive, Clint arrived at the Mount Holyoke campus where his girlfriend resided. He was invited up to her room, in compliance with dormitory policy, to take a nap before beginning his search for residential and office space. Four hours later, he returned to the campus parking lot where he had left his car to discover that it — as well as the valuables contained therein — was gone.
Eventually, it was discovered the car had been towed by Mount Holyoke Public Safety to a private tow lot away from campus. With his car missing, Clint’s ability to search for a residence was severely hindered. Due to differences with his girlfriend’s roommate, Clint was asked to leave campus; he did so, and has never returned. For reasons unknown, the roommate reported Clint’s situation regarding his move, as well as the particulars of the contents of his car. Also unclear is why this then escalated to Mount Holyoke Pubic Safety seeking a warrant to search the car, followed by the arrest of Mr. Cornelius in the lobby of his hotel.
Convoluted and unclear law
In performing due diligence, it is clear Clint did his research regarding transporting firearms across state lines, or he would not have had them secured in hardcases, separated from the ammunition and magazines, in the locked trunk of his vehicle. Additionally, the following Massachusetts law would have reassured him of his decision to bring his valuables with him during his move:
(j) Any new resident moving into the commonwealth, any resident of the commonwealth returning after having been absent from the commonwealth for not less than 180 consecutive days or any resident of the commonwealth upon being released from active service with any of the armed services of the United States with respect to any firearm, rifle or shotgun and any ammunition therefor then in his possession, for 60 days after such release, return or entry into the commonwealth;
What this clause fails to inform is that it does not cover “magazines”, specifically possession of the “high capacity feeding devices” with which Clint was charged. Why this should have occurred to Clint is unclear; the clause does not include “trigger” or “barrel” which are intrinsic parts of a firearm. Likewise, a magazine is an intrinsic part of the firearm, and the devices will perform minimally — if at all — without the magazine, as is the case with most magazine-fed firearms. It should be noted that the “high capacity feeding device” referred to in the charges against Clint refers to the six magazines he was charged with possessing, despite the fact that two of the magazines were 13-round magazines that came factory-issued with the pistol he bought new, and the other four magazines were 20-round rifle magazines that were included with the custom-built collector’s rifle when he purchased it — he had no aftermarket or additional magazines. There were no huge “banana clips”, drums, belts, or other things one might instinctively associate with “high capacity feeding device.”
Judge Carhart, presiding at pretrial, went so far as to say, “it doesn’t make sense, but it’s not — it says “ammunition,” but it doesn’t say “magazine.” So I think you would be able to interpose that defense for ammunition, but I don’t think you can for a magazine. And that doesn’t make any sense, I’ll grant you that. But that’s the law.”
Carhart went on,“As I said earlier, I’ll grant you, it does not make sense. And again, if you look at the overall legislative intent, magazines are much less of a threat to the public than the ammunition. So you’re asking why the Defendant should be put in jeopardy for having a magazine when he would be allowed the defense were it ammunition. And I can’t answer the question.”
Carhart concluded, “How can you prosecute somebody for having a magazine and not give them an exemption but they get an exemption for a firearm and ammunition. That doesn’t make any sense.”
Recognizing the blatant inconsistency in the law, Judge Carhart then sent questions to the Massachusetts Appeals Court, and suspended Clint’s trial until it replied; reportedly, this was only the second time in his many years on the bench that this judge had ever sent questions up prior to trial. The appellate court, consisting of three senior judges, took 17 months to form a return regarding the questions regarding the new resident clause, its potential application to magazines, and at times debated sending it to the US Supreme Court as a Second Amendment issue. This begs the question: how is a new resident supposed to understand the law if three learned members of the court have difficulty agreeing on its interpretation?
The appellate court’s return was thus:
The court answered, no, finding that satisfaction of G.L. c. 140, § 129C(j), does not provide a defense to a violation of G.L. c. 269, § 10(m).
Therefore, defense at trial was rendered impossible due to the law: Clint was left with no alternative but to take a plea, as with that return, the only question the trial’s presiding judge could frame for the jury would have been “Did the defendant have the magazines?” The only answer the jury could have returned is “yes”, and the presiding judge would have had to impose mandatory minimum sentencing, including 2.5 years in the state penitentiary for each count. Despite its incongruity, the law in both ways tied the hands of the appeal justices and the superior court judge.
ANY firearm, rifle, or shotgun. ANY ammunition therefor then in his possession. But not a particular component of the firearm. Especially when that particular component is validated and legal under the exact same singular license that would have protected the firearms, and which he has by law 60 days to seek:
“CLASS “A” LTC: Permits the purchase, possession and carrying of all ammunition, handguns, rifles, shotguns and feeding devices (both large and non-large capacity). This is the only license that allows the carrying of concealed handguns-either loaded or unloaded. [mass.g0v]
The same, one, singular license that he had 60 days to procure to protect his firearms also would have made legal his magazines.
Reportedly, in an interview after the plea: “Thomas said Cornelius’ new resident defense may have had merit, but there was no excuse for possessing large-capacity weapons – which are strictly forbidden under state law even with firearms permits.” [gazettenet.com]
It is not clear whether this is a misquote or if this is what Mr. Thomas actually believes, but unlike other laws involved with this case, the Class A LTC seems simple and direct–and in flat contradiction to Mr. Thomas’ assertion.
Apart from the nonsensical nature of that particular legislation, there is another aspect to this case that needs to be made known:
Mr. Cornelius’ vehicle was towed illegally, and the search warrant for the vehicle was sought and executed by an agent who did not have the authority to do so. Additionally, that same agent then made several false or misleading statements to the Grand Jury during the indictment. The Commonwealth’s claim of who executed the warrant changed from the agent to a local police officer, who did not testify before the Grand Jury, nor made a return of a warrant regarding the search or seizure. Procedurally, any one of these claims is more than sufficient to have had the evidence suppressed and the charges dropped.
The tow was illegal:
Mount Holyoke College and its student parking lot are private property. Clint’s car was towed by the College’s Department of Public Safety because it was in a student parking lot without a student parking lot sticker and its Georgia vehicle registration had expired. Because the car was parked on private property, the College could not tow the car without notifying the Chief of Police of South Hadley, the town in which Mount Holyoke is located. The College did not notify the South Hadley Police Chief. By failing to do so, the College, through its Department of Public Safety, violated M.G.L. c. 266, §120D. Section 120D is a criminal statute which provides for fining its violators. Section 120D is not the exclusive remedy for illegally taking a motor vehicle, and the College, through its Department of Public Safety, may have also violated, inter alia, M.G.L. c. 266, §28 – motor vehicle theft.
The warrant was sought and executed by an agent without authority to do so:
It is undisputed that Mount Holyoke College Public Safety Officer Fournier is a special state police officer (a “special”) and not a regular police officer M.G.L. c. 22C, §68. The statute uses the term “regular police officers” to distinguish special state police officer powers. Fournier’s claim that he was a “police officer” rather than a special is significant and fatal to the warrant because as a special, he could not seek a search warrant for a place off campus (“at a location not within the statutory jurisdictional boundaries of the employing agency”) without notifying the Massachusetts State Police Troop Commander. It is undisputed that Fournier never made such notification. Had Fournier truthfully stated his status as a special with its limited powers, the reviewing magistrate would likely have refused to issue the warrant unless the threshold notification requirements were made.
False or misleading statements were made to the Grand Jury:
Public Safety Officer Fournier identified himself as a police officer, he alone was the only witness and claimed that he executed the warrant, and his signature is on the return for the search. He also misidentified the laws allegedly violated, and his testimony to the Grand Jury is in direct conflict with the case the Commonwealth later presented to lend credibility to the charges.
Small Town Collusion
Mount Holyoke’s hyper-zealousness and overreaching their authority, from the tow to the improper actions of its public safety officers (such as racially profiling a tenured professor [Mount Holyoke News]), was the genesis for this entire debacle. But what may have been more important than the charges themselves was to shield Mount Holyoke from its own overextension—and the possible repercussions that might follow if their initial actions weren’t properly defended.
When these collective arguments were brought forth at pretrial — each conclusive on its own merits —Judd Carhart, the presiding judge, opened the proceedings by casually informing Clint and his attorney that no matter what they had to say, the case would be going to trial—but that said, they were free to talk all they liked. [the full transcript is currently being sought]. Carhart did not even make a show of carefully considering the arguments or their validity, he simply waved them aside. In any other venue the arguments at least would have been considered carefully; it is virtually undeniable that, if that had occurred in this instance, the case against Mr. Cornelius would have been dismissed. Why then did the judge so roundly dismiss them without even giving the pretense of consideration?
Carhart and Scheibel
At the time charges were brought against Mr. Cornelius, the District Attorney was Elizabeth Scheibel, who may be familiar to those who followed the Phoebe Prince case, or the case against hobby chemist Jack Robison [blogspot.com], as well as numerous other cases involving her office, including Pottygate [masslive.com], which “amounted to a ringing condemnation of the Northwestern District Attorney’s office”. Investigative journalist Emily Bazelon’s expose on Scheibel’s aggressiveness as a prosecutor details some of these cases [slate.com].
Judd Carhart was the sitting judge on Mr. Cornelius’ case, as well as on the Prince case, and as the above-referenced article shows, Carhart was also Scheibel’s direct superior as DA before he was elevated to the bench in 1993, at which time Scheibel succeeded him as the first female DA in Massachusetts. Carhart and his protege Scheibel then worked jointly in the same courtroom for more than a decade before Mr. Cornelius’ case came to them.
If Scheibel’s aggressive policy to pursue felonies blind to circumstance, her relationship to Carhart in the same courtroom, and the false testimony and overreaching by Mount Holyoke’s “special” public safety officer don’t cast enough suspicion on why such compelling motions were casually disregarded at pretrial, here is something else to consider: Scheibel is an alumni of Mount Holyoke. If protecting a local school from possible reprisal due to its public safety office’s over-zealousness isn’t cause for predisposition, protecting her alma mater may just be. Ultimately, the DA’s office wasn’t responsible for bringing the initial charges, nor for the illegal tow (or rather, theft) of Clint’s automobile, nor for the warrant sought that was illegal outside of the campus jurisdiction, nor even for the return of the search, seizure, or arrest, which all likewise occurred outside of jurisdiction: it was Mount Holyoke that would be responsible and accountable for those actions. And thereby vulnerable should the DA’s office concede to give up prosecution of Clint’s case.
Judge Moriarty, who oversaw the proceedings on the 15th of August that included the plea bargain, noted that the matter involving Mr. Cornelius was regulatory and not criminal, but that it was out of his realm of control as it is his duty to enforce the laws of the Commonwealth, not to rewrite them. The current District Attorney agreed to reduce the charges against Mr. Cornelius to a single misdemeanor and a year sentence, along with forfeiture of his confiscated possessions. While the Commonwealth has clearly shown compassion in this case, is it enough?
It is difficult to see any pretense that would warrant punishing Clint for what amounts to poor legislation and provincial bullying, but even were it so, Clint has already suffered immensely. He forfeited his valuables as part of the seizure–not just the firearms and other confiscated property, but also the loss of his illegally towed and eventually sold automobile, for which he received no compensation. He has likewise incurred numerous expenses in traveling to and from Massachusetts for dozens of hearings—at least one of which was canceled the day of the hearing, after he had already arrived by plane in Boston and was driving a rental car to Western Massachusetts (it goes without saying why he elected not to remain in Massachusetts, in light of his initial reception). The legal fees and the simple cost of living during this are significant, but still greater due to employment hardships, as it does little to improve the interview process when the cursory background check shows pending “violent” felonies. And finally, he has undergone the emotional duress of repeatedly failing to see anything resembling justice be done on his behalf, despite what Judge Moriarty deemed extraordinary efforts gone to by Clint’s attorney Mr. Sinnott. Four and a half years of his life have already been consumed by this case, and it is insult to grievous injury that the conclusion is—not vindication—but the demand for still another year of his life, apart from his friends, family and loved ones, unable to work, and paid for at the expense of the citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
The succeeding administration that has taken over since Scheibel stepped down at the end of 2009 continues policy in at least one respect in the experience of Clint and his lawyer: they are uncommunicative with defending attorneys, to the point that they forward their memos and proposed arguments the morning of trials and hearings. Under the previous Scheibel administration as well as the current one, it was policy to receive memos for the day’s hearing while already in transit to Western Massachusetts. Additionally, at no point did the Scheibel administration make contact with Clint or his attorney (nor at least with Robison during his case, or the accused in the Prince case) or make any effort to actually discover the circumstances of his case beyond the charges.
Clint was deemed, by the Mount Holyoke Public Safety Department, to have been no threat to Mount Holyoke, and likewise was not considered a threat by the current DA. Clint Cornelius is a productive, educated member of society who has never run afoul of the law and hasn’t incurred so much as a parking or speeding ticket during the four and a half years of his case’s course through the Massachusetts judicial system. He is a strength coach and authority on fitness, and is the author of the book Brain Over Brawn [brainoverbrawn.com], which is available for purchase on Amazon [amazon.com]. In addition, since 2009 when it was first published, he has made his book available as a free ebook download on his website. His efforts have helped tens of thousands of people toward better health and fitness, and he has done so without asking anything beyond voluntary reciprocation. Mr. Cornelius grew up in Oklahoma, then attended graduate school in Texas before living for nearly a decade in Georgia. He may have a southerner’s grasp of firearms and rules pertaining thereto, but has done nothing with criminal intent.
In conclusion, Clint is truly a victim of a wrong-place, wrong-time circumstance, and is not only suffering due to poorly constructed legislation but is quite possibly the victim of provincial bias, especially considering the office in question has been accused of the same on numerous occasions. Clint deserves not only the mercy of the Commonwealth, but personal vindication, and to serve as a cautionary tale for other would-be residents of the state regarding the precariousness of their Second Amendment rights.